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Abstract:  Pierre Bourdieu’s field and habitus approach to the economy offers rich 
theoretical presuppositions of the interrelationship between social structure and 
agency, but they have not yet been sufficiently integrated into economic sociology. 
This article outlines the key theoretical assumptions of this approach in relation to 
those of the embeddedness tradition. Bringing the elements of field and habitus to 
the center of attention helps in examining how cognitive and historical factors 
matter for explaining individual action. It integrates different notions of 
uncertainty in economic literature into the discussion of the underlying action 
principles of the Bourdieuian approach. The study concludes that only a historical 
perspective which integrates social, structural and cognitive analysis can adequately 
explain the generation, reproduction, and transformation of individual action 
itself. The article sketches the broad conception of such a theoretical synthesis in 
the conclusion. 
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The critical assessment of rationality in economic action is a dominant theme of many 
scholars in socioeconomics and economic sociology who identified uncertainty as the 
foundation for a critique of rational actor models and for the introduction of 
alternative approaches. Informed by the insight that actual decision making could not 
fit the rational paradigm originating from a world of complete information, 
independent decision making and fixed preferences, many economists have developed 
new approaches to reconstruct rational action. Included among them are the 
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prominent attempts by Frank Knight, through his work on Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit 
(1921), and by Herbert Simon (1957) through his notion of bounded rationality (for 
similar views see Arestis 1992 and Garner 1982). The discussion of bounded 
rationality has become important even in the game theoretical approaches to 
uncertainty and information (see for instance George Akerlof 1970 and Michael 
Spence 1974), often with the aim of refining the rational actor models.  
Another strand of research originates from evolutionary economics as proposed 
by Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter (1982, 2002). They developed a concrete 
analysis of cognitive and structural foundations of technological innovations. In 
sociology, Harrison White (2002) provided a network-based approach to markets in 
which embedded agents learn from each other through social interaction. Network 
sociologist Marc Granovetter is prominent in this regard. He was innovative in 
introducing the relational basis of economic action by rejecting the homo economicus in 
its pure, determinist version that, as he formulates, “disallows any impact of social 
structure and social relations” (Granovetter 1985, 483).1 In contrast, Karl Polanyi 
([1944] 2001) argues for the generic notion of homo economicus as historically specific 
and institutionally embedded.  
This paper forms part of a broader discussion on the cognitive and structural 
foundations of economic action under uncertainty within the current forms and 
structures of the modern economy. Its purpose is to assess the value of Bourdieu’s 
(2005a, 2005b) field and habitus concepts in the analysis of cultural and symbolic 
forms of economic action, particularly if such a theory emphasizes the social 
mechanics of the market field. The field notion refers to the social space as a system 
of positions and relations in which the habitus operates. The habitus is understood as 
the set of relatively durable dispositions and schemata of thought and perception. It is 
considered a valuable alternative to the rational logic of the ahistorical and often 
isolated actor as assumed in economic orthodoxy. It allows to link social structure to 
the individual and its past experience. Given this journal’s readership, the paper is 
intended to spread awareness among economic sociologists, network theorists, and 
socio-economists about the theoretical and empirical richness of Bourdieu’s approach 
to the economy.2 
This paper is organized in the following steps. The first section introduces 
Bourdieu’s understanding of the economy and his critical response to the 
embeddedness tradition. Economic reason and its underlying central categories 
habitus, field, and capital are discussed by pointing at three key aspects: the dimension 
of time, the role of power struggle and the generative nature of the habitus. It is then 
followed by the argument for the reasonability of strategies oriented toward rule 
following, on the one hand, and innovating on the other. Such a perspective is expected 
to give more prominence to the process of reproduction of strategies and social 
structure over time, if one would not account for the specific conditions that facilitate 
a generative, and thus innovative, rationale, rather than a reproductive one. 
The paper integrates, therefore, different types of uncertainty — particularly, 
procedural (e.g., Dosi and Egidi 1988) and fundamental uncertainty (Dequech 2001), 
into the discussion about economic action to link Bourdieu’s economic reason to 
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uncertainty and change. Here, the paper partly incorporates, but qualifies, the 
criticisms of Bourdieu’s theory for not paying enough attention to the possibility of 
creativity and structural change. The subsequent section focuses on one specific form 
of action, market signaling. It illustrates in what way Bourdieu’s approach to the 
economy may lead to different conclusions with respect to one of the most prominent 
attempts in network analysis, the network-based market model developed by Harrison 
White (1981, 2002). His work marks a turning point from the classical structuralism 
toward an integration of structural and cultural elements into the analysis of social 
networks (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Fuhse and Mützel 2010). 
In the concluding section, the paper argues against mutual exclusion of 
Bourdieu’s approach and the embeddedness perspective. It points out that economic 
action may be best understood as resulting from socially situated cognition and 
sociocultural construction of markets over time. Such a theory provides for an analysis 
of the cognitive and structural dimensions of market transformations, while an 
account of different conditions of uncertainty allows for a better identification of 
when change may occur, and thus innovation also.  
At the same time, as markets have to deal with uncertainty, mere resource flows 
are inadequate in guiding action. Therefore, they have to be supplemented with 
factors, such as habits or creativity, which may differ among agents, and under 
procedural and fundamental uncertainty. The analytical constructs of field and 
habitus, as Powell and DiMaggio (1991) note, have marked the cognitive turn in 
social theory, a shift in the emphasis from the social psychology of values, norms and 
attitudes, to classifications, routines, scripts, and schemata (see also Widick 2004, 
203). They provide network analysis with a stronger conceptualization of the agent to 
analyze the cognitive and motivational logics of action in a macro-social context.  
 
Bourdieu’ s Criticism of Embeddedness 
 
With his notion of the economy as a field, Bourdieu provides an alternative approach 
to the embeddedness concept, which he criticizes in at least three ways: First, he 
substitutes the a-historical nature which characterizes the embedded social actors in 
Granovetter’s and Polanyi’s theory by the principle of historicity highlighting 
transformation processes. Second, he complicates the idea of network flows, which 
are explanatory for embedded action, by the element of power struggle as the 
mechanism co-constructing field and habitus. Third, he replaces the principles of 
economic rationality which motivate most embedded social actors by the principle of 
reasonability resulting from the encounter of actors with individual dispositions and 
cognitive schemata in the economic field.3 Even though it is not the goal of this paper 
to present Bourdieu’s theory of action in a comprehensive perspective, the following 
sections show how Bourdieu’s work offers ways of dealing with the above mentioned 
aspects, and point at the relevance of his historical approach to understanding the 
evolution of fields and factors that can transform them. 
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Social Space and the Dimension of Time 
 
Most neoclassical economists would assume the process of market coordination 
and study the qualities of the market without understanding how the market actually 
came about (see Boyer 2008). Most economic sociologists, instead, would provide an 
analysis of how markets and institutions emerge, and at the same time discharge the 
neoclassical framework whose product is the market of pure and perfect competition 
(Garcia 1986).4 For Bourdieu and the work he inspired in economic sociology, every 
market is a result of interactions between actors. These actors govern the framing of 
game-rules to ensure the smooth adjustment of supply and demand. On a general 
level, this does not seem to differ much from Granovetter’s and Polanyi’s 
embeddedness approaches, if Bourdieu were not to pay more attention to the 
dimension of historical time, as opposed to time, as regarded by economists which is 
that of calculation, anticipation and movement toward economic equilibrium (Boyer 
2008).  
Allowing for the dimension of time serves as a starting point for Bourdieu’s 
market analysis. A market, that is to say a field, is characterized by a patterned set of 
practices that suggest competent action in conformity with rules and roles (Bourdieu 
1977). It is made up of a structure of actual and potential relations (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992). Bourdieu’s own vision of the market field is well expressed in the 
following statement from Principles of an Economic Anthropology:  
 
What is called the market is the totality of exchange relations between 
competing agents, direct interactions that depend, as Simmel has it, on 
“indirect conflict,” or in other words, on the socially constructed structure 
[of the field] of the relations of force to which the different agents engaged 
in the field contribute to varying degrees, through the modifications they 
manage to impose upon it, by drawing particularly, on the state power they 
are able to control and guide. (Bourdieu 2005a, 81) 
 
The transformation of the rules of the game shapes the functioning of the field. 
This has further implications for historical transformations of the market field itself. 
First, market fields are not closed entities. Second, the relationship between fields and 
agents is circular, in that the involvement in a field shapes the agent’s perceptions and 
dispositions. These in turn, shape actions that reproduce the field (cf. Crossley 2001).5  
An example of the market analyzed as a social construct can be found in 
Bourdieu’s housing survey (Bourdieu 2005b). It showed that people’s propensity to 
buy, rather than to rent, depended on what social group they belong to, what their 
cultural habits were, and the fact that supply and demand were socially co-
constructed. One may describe these interactions on the housing market in the form 
of a three-way relation between the buyer, the seller, and the social space with all its 
legal environment and common practices. This market, as specific social space, has its 
own logic, which not only shapes the particular characteristics of that space, it also 
moderates, as Rainer Diaz-Bone (2006, 43) notes, the way in which external factors 
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impact the market itself (see Florian and Hillebrandt 2006). At the same time, 
homologies between positions in a specific social space and in a particular market are 
interpreted as resulting from individual action.  
To summarize, Bourdieu emphasizes the social-historical dimension for the 
construction of the market. Accordingly, the market is an interplay between 
individual agency, field structure, and external factors (such as state power) over time. 
This direction of research on markets has been systematically pursued in the United 
States by economic sociologists, for instance Neil Fligstein (2001) who developed his 
political-cultural approach, and White (2002) who conceived the idea of network-
based self-reproducing markets. Both attempts were strongly informed by Bourdieu’s 
field construct. 
 
Power Struggle Constitutes Fields 
 
The second aspect of embeddedness criticism relates to the idea that fields and 
habitus are co-constructed during a power struggle.  
In most economic theories, the market is the main authority for coordinating 
the behaviors of decentralized agents. These agents are assumed to have the same 
amount of influence over each other, or no influence at all in the case of perfect 
competition. Bourdieu’s economic sociology however insists on the idea that whatever 
be the field, certain agents have more power than others do. They face inequality of 
opportunity as their resources are unequally distributed (Bourdieu 2005a, 77).  
Resources, namely the various forms of capital, constitute the market field as 
they generate counter-positions due to competition and conflict over the reproduction 
of unequal distribution of capital. The stock of capital is a fundamental resource to 
gain advantage within a field. The latter is so constructed that agents who occupy 
similar or neighboring positions are placed in similar situations. The force attached to 
an agent depends on what Bourdieu calls strengths which are differential factors of 
success and which may provide a competitive advantage (2005a, 75).  
Furthermore, the Bourdieuian analysis operates with a variety of material and 
non-material forms of interchangeable capital. They represent forms of power within 
specific fields. These range from cultural capital in the form of educational credentials 
to financial capital. They also comprise social capital such as useful contacts and 
networks, to technological capital in the form of innovative technical equipment. One 
may further mention commercial forms such as brands, organizational capital that 
may take the form of a firm’s reputation and symbolic (status) forms (see Bourdieu 
1986).  
Cultural, technical and commercial capital types exist in objectivized form such 
as equipment or instruments. They also exist in embodied form, literally linked to 
individual body possessing competences and skills. In other words, capital is inscribed 
in objective and subjective structures, which thereby turns into a “guarantor for the 
regularity and stability of the social world” (Svendsen and Svendsen 2004, 241). The 
embodied form of capital refers to “the external wealth converted into an integral part 
of the person, into a habitus” (Bourdieu 1986, 242). It cannot be transmitted 
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instantaneously (unlike money or property rights) and remains marked by its earliest 
conditions of acquisition which determine its distinctive value.6  
Social capital comprises the totality of resources, including financial capital and 
information, which may be activated through a more or less mobilizable network of 
relations that procures advantage by providing higher returns on investment 
(Bourdieu 2005b). One may consider that the volume of an agent’s social capital is 
dependent on the size of the network of connections, which the individual can 
mobilize, and on the volume of capital (i.e., cultural, economic, or symbolic), 
possessed by the other members with whom the agent is connected (Bourdieu 1986, 
249).  
Most network approaches focus on the structure and content of ties. A 
prominent example is Uzzi (1997), who developed the notion of arm’s length and 
emdedded ties. Furthermore, Granovetter (1988) discussed relational and structural 
ties. Finally, I would at least like to mention Coleman (1988) and Portes and 
Sensenbrenner (1993) whose work on the embeddedness as social capital marks a 
fundamental advancement in the field. In contrast, Bourdieu looked for the power 
attached to those ties. Such power is attributed to mutual recognition of capital based 
upon social network, group or class membership, or in other words social fields.  
Each field facilitates a specific form of interest, a specific illusio, as tacit 
recognition, as the value of the “stakes of the game and as practical mastery of its 
rules” (Widick 2004, 201). One may argue that internal and external recognitions 
may be distinguished. Internal recognition (of capital) takes place within the field, for 
instance social capital in the form of strong ties that a person has built throughout 
his/her career. This social capital, to the extent that it is recognized as legitimate 
within the respective field, converts into a symbolic resource that functions in line 
with the rules of that field.7  
External recognition, on the other hand, reflects the outside perspective. It 
refers for instance to the economic system and its assumptions about the value of each 
component of the field-specific capital for organizational production. These 
assumptions, in turn, signal to the economic field and thus influence its logic of 
capital transformation and conversion (Mayrhofer et al. 2004). The extent to which 
one can internally and externally recognize the capital is what helps in inferring the 
power relations of one field to another. This expanded concept of capital and its 
recognition can be viewed to complement the structural and relational analysis in the 
embeddedness tradition by integrating the symbolic dimension. It reminds one of 
Lévi-Strauss’s idea that social reality is fundamentally symbolic. He argued that economic 
aspects derive from specific symbolic operations of definition, which constitute social 
order (see Bourdieu 1977).  
Field characteristics can be analyzed and understood only by taking into account 
the entire interaction process of individuals (unequally) endowed in terms of 
economic, social and symbolic capital. Therefore, it is the heterogeneity of social 
positions that generates habitus and lifestyle (Bourdieu 1980). In contrast to the 
economists who consider individual preferences and beliefs as exogenous, Bourdieu 
aimed at analyzing the distribution and conversion of various forms of capital and 
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their evolution over time. He contributed to an understanding of field formation 
through dynamic interactions of unequal agents, which can also be applied to various 
markets. He argued that the counter-position between unequal agents, in terms of the 
dominant and the dominated, introduces another dynamic aspect into the analysis. 
Each field hosts, therefore, struggles to maintain or transform the unequal 
distribution of capital.  
Depending on the relative strengths that individuals can put into the struggle, 
the “space of possibles” constrains their choice of strategies to preserve or improve 
their capital (Bourdieu 1981a). The dominant may, for instance, cling to the strategies 
that would allow them to stabilize their position. Such stabilizing strategies would 
yield at the distribution of chances of success or barriers to entry. Similarly, the 
economic sociologist, Neil Fligstein (1996, 2001), whose work on markets is strongly 
informed by Bourdieu’s field concept, argues that issues of internal organization 
revolve around producing stable social relations. He enhanced the field concept of his 
work on the market as a political field. According to his conception, markets are 
social constructions that are always co-constructed by the political-cultural rules and 
regulations of the state. Fligstein argued here very much on the lines of Bourdieu who 
said that the state shapes the market from inside and outside (Bourdieu 2005b; see 
also Mützel 2006). 
Bourdieu’s analysis is also concerned with destabilizing forces. Accordingly, the 
dominated, and new entrants would seek strategies to destabilize the current positions 
of strength. They would develop innovative strategies destined to devalue the capital 
that is held by the dominant. It would, as a consequence, allow for strategies of 
change, as opposed to more or less identical strategies of reproduction ad infinitum. 
Even though destabilization of a field is not the most frequent case, Bourdieu (2005a) 
asserts, particularly in his later works, the possibility of change that can be brought 
about by conflicting relations of unequal agents. Only a superficial or partial reading 
of his work may hence lead to an overestimation of the deterministic nature of 
structures as constraints to any dynamic transformation of the economic field. 
 
Habitus and Rational Choice 
 
The third criticism that is brought to the fore by Bourdieu concerns the 
principle of rationality. It is implicit in many embeddedness views, particularly in 
network analysis (for a detailed discussion, see Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). While 
opposing economic orthodoxy, which conceives of individuals as homo economicus 
subjecting their decision making to rational calculation, and as actors performing 
their roles or acting mostly in conformity with models, Bourdieu (1977) proposes his 
concept of habitus.  
With the habitus construct, he strongly rejected rational actors as actors without 
a past who are oriented to the future. He sets the habitus against the homo economicus 
that constantly keeps adapting its actions to some goals without reference to the social 
experience (Bourdieu 2005b, 211). However, his analysis has often been reduced to a 
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Beckerian economist vision, too much inspired by neoclassical economics, because he 
put personal interests (material benefit and satisfaction) at the center of his model. 
In what follows, the author will discuss selectively the principle of reasonability, 
as opposed to rationality adopted in neoclassical economics, the account of 
heterogeneity among agents and their interrelationship. A key point is Bourdieu’s 
concern for social differences in the dispositions toward various kinds of behavior 
(rational or not). They open up to him avenues for an epistemological and 
methodological critique of the assumptions on the logic of action taken by rational 
choice models. Any empirically observed deviation should not just be regarded as 
irrationality or incomplete market as in a mechanical conception of the economy.  
For Bourdieu, economic actors come to develop reasonable expectations, not 
rational expectations. They develop them by drawing on their habitus, which is 
referred to as a system of dispositions, thought, and perception. This habitus 
functions as a kind of cultural and social screen between the actor and reality 
(Bourdieu [1984] 1993, cf. Swedberg 2009). The interest of the habitus construct is to 
explicitly emphasize the reasons (which are to some extent endogenous) of the 
heterogeneity of agents.  
While neoclassical theory assumes homogenous and equal actors, Bourdieu’s 
agents apply different cognitive maps for their decisions in markets in which they are 
not equally related in terms of power, capacity, and information. The habitus, when 
shared among individuals, refers to “collective practice of the same modus operandi” 
that is central to collaborative work (Bourdieu 2005a, 76). Such collective practice is 
immediately foreseeable and intelligible, and taken for granted.  
Market exchange is never given as economists might argue, but is socially and 
culturally constructed. Interaction is channeled by field properties and by forces that 
agents can put into their struggle. Bourdieu’s study “Travail et travailleurs en 
Algérie” (Work and Workers in Algeria) brings evidence for this co-construction 
(Bourdieu 1963). It showed that the economic field had ultimately been transformed 
by modern capitalism. Most striking was the development of a new calculating and 
controlling spirit, which clashed with the culture of domestic economy in which the 
family provided the logic of exchange and people repeated what had always been 
done. In a similar vein, Franz Schultheis argued that capitalism facilitated the 
selection of a new ethos which made the homo economicus of his ideal-typical form to 
the entrepreneurial model well suitable to the emerging managerial profession 
(Schultheis 2006, 131). 
Bourdieu (1963, 376) distinguishes between two types of economic agents: first, 
the rational entrepreneur who submits possibility to rational calculation; second, the 
economic adventurer who accepts the future to come and uses chances for his/her own 
purpose. The author agrees with Richard Swedberg (2009) who concludes that the 
Bourdieuian analysis allows a minimum of irrationality and with Rainer Diaz-Bone’s 
(2006) argument on the existence of various rationalities. She acknowledged that the 
formal rationality, referred to as the capacity to methodologically and accurately carry 
out calculations, was only one out of many rationalities.  
Economic Action, Fields and Uncertainty 
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Apart from rationalities, the habitus operates on the principle of adaptation. The 
adaptive habitus is part of the underlying grammar of action. It generates behaviors 
that are particularly well suited to the conditions from which they arise, which they 
tend to reproduce and with which they maintain social order (Bourdieu 2005a).8 
Recruitment processes are a good example where actors attribute importance to the 
role of competence, skill, know-how and disposition, which resonate with certain 
types of capital and dispositions in a particular field, say a firm.  
A study of French employers published in State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field 
of Power empirically demonstrated the existence of considerable homology between 
the volume and structure (embodied and objectified) of the capital of firms and their 
directors (Bourdieu [1989] 1996). This internal structure was also closely related to 
the position of the firm in the overall economic context. This correspondence 
consisted of, on the one hand, the volume of the various firms’ capital, and on the 
other, the structure of the capital distribution among various directors.  
Similarly, career research by Hanappi (2007) and Mayrhofer et al. (2002) showed 
that career habitus, made up mainly of field-specific social and cultural capital, was a 
decisive factor in the advancement of one’s position in the professional hierarchy. 
The main finding was that individuals with similar volumes and structures of capital 
were more capable to adapt to a certain firm and its internal structure of power 
positions. Indices for such structure of power positions within a firm might have 
taken the form of the hierarchical position of the labor force, the educational capital 
of the labor force, or the bureaucratic differentiation.  
The most basic misunderstanding, however, concerning the concept of habitus 
is that it can be reduced to habit, that is according to Boyer (2008), the mechanical 
reproduction which leads to the disappearance of individual autonomy and, 
therefore, to a static history marked by permanent domination of the same holders of 
capital over the dominated (Caillé 2002). Such conception is not without reason, 
because Bourdieu adopted a structuralist view in his earlier work, for instance, on 
educational systems (Bourdieu 1981b). However, in Rogers Brubaker’s view (1996, 
43), the notion of habitus includes subjects — active individuals and their dispositions, 
aspirations, expectations — in social explanation. This marks Bourdieu’s distance from 
structuralist thought, and allows the author to include it as a supplementary factor for 
an analysis of change and innovation. 
 
Uncertainty, Change and Innovation in Bourdieu’ s Work 
 
Instead of calculating risks, as economists believe, Bourdieu’s actors confront reality 
through a combination of structural constraint and spontaneity. The following quote 
reflects his understanding of habitus more explicitly:  
 
Habitus is something that is powerfully generative. . . . Habitus is a 
principle of invention, which, produced by history, is relatively 
independent of history: dispositions are lasting, something that leads to all 
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sorts of effects of hysteresis (delay, discrepancy . . .). (Bourdieu 1980, 134-
135) 
 
What emerges from this definition is, first, that the strategies produce a response that 
is not pre-given in its direction in the stimulus, and that is not deducible from 
knowledge of the situation alone — the habitus is an active construct. Second, the 
conception of habitus is the trace of past trajectories that agents set in their strategies 
against the forces of the field. This makes up the historical dimension of habitus and is 
a main factor of field evolution.  
Accordingly, Bourdieu (1980, 35) describes a strategy, in the form of an 
investment in a field, as the historical effect of agreement between two realizations of 
the social: in things (by institution) and in bodies (by incorporation). The matching of 
one with the other is only a special case when institutions and habitus are both 
products of the same historical process. The habitus, however, is neither necessarily 
adapted nor coherent and it can happen that dispositions fail to match the field and 
the collective expectations that control its working (Bourdieu 1997). A mismatch 
between the two would lead the field into crisis and cause disruption of regularities. 
Depending on one’s perspective, such mismatch is, at the same time, a match with the 
group habitus intending to break with the dominating rules.  
This theoretical perspective can be found throughout Bourdieu’s work, no 
matter whether he talked about the single-family housing sector (Bourdieu 2005b), 
the redeployment strategies of the French elites (Bourdieu [1989] 1996), or the 
Algérian workers (Bourdieu 1963). The disruption of regularities may thus be viewed 
in two ways: First, as a consequence of a de-synchronization of field and habitus, or in 
other words, of a lack of correspondence between field and habitus (see also Florian 
2006); second, the conception of the habitus is a cause for further field-habitus 
transformations. Such transformation may take the form of a reconfiguration of field 
structures, or the activation of new habitus facets. 
Competition between the dominated and the dominating brings in a dynamic 
aspect. What is changed can cause a mismatch with the previous dominant habitus; 
so, to regain the former position and restabilize the former system, the formerly 
dominant individuals need to innovate. This breaks the chain of infinite 
reproduction. Despite the relatively stable core of cognitive schemes and dispositions, 
and considering over time, the habitus is a malleable construct. Such malleability 
bears the potential for structural change, which in turn may transform the habitus 
itself. The habitus is transformed if the more or less binding rules of practical reason 
are recognized as reasonable by the agents’ practices and rules of thumb, pre-reflexive, 
unconscious style and ethos. In other words, the binding rules and their objective 
constraints get institutionalized when incorporated into reasonable orientations for 
action in the habitus dispositions. Similarly, Crossley (2001) states that patterns and 
underlying principles of social contexts are incorporated in the habitus as both an 
inclination and a modus operandi.9 
If one now considers the social and cognitive factors, he or she may find a 
starting point to look at pre-conditions to activate, reproduce, and transform the 
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space of institutional constraints and opportunities. Actors incorporate social 
structures and by doing so produce external effects. These are relatively independent 
of the actors, so that some “space of possibles” as Bourdieu calls it, is activated or 
newly created. Actors are granted certain autonomy to behave spontaneously and 
creatively, and to depart from collective practice. This suggests that Bourdieu’s actors 
face uncertainty, which the habitus is supposed to practically master (Bourdieu 
2005b).  
What notion of uncertainty does Bourdieu’s work implicitly assume for the 
underlying logic of economic behavior? And, do most classical assumptions about 
uncertainty in economic literature apply to social reality as seen in Bourdieu’s theory? 
An attempt is made in the following paragraphs to answer these questions, 
particularly with reference to the two notions of uncertainty, which are considered 
most important to the theoretical deliberations made above: procedural uncertainty 
and fundamental uncertainty. 
In The Social Structures of the Economy (2005b, 15), Bourdieu argues that the 
habitus helps to practically master uncertainty. This uncertainty is said to result from 
people’s limited computational and cognitive capabilities in complex situations. Such 
understanding of uncertainty is generally referred to in economics literature as 
procedural uncertainty, which is closely linked to the notion of bounded rationality as 
proposed by Herbert Simon (1957). In this case, economic reality is complex and 
populated by individuals with limited capabilities, given the available information.  
To look at the rationality of action, a prominent sociological approach has been 
made by Jens Beckert. Beckert (1996, 2003) builds his critique against economic 
theorizing, not on the action-model of homo economicus per se but on the underlying 
assumption that economic actors can, even in complex situations, deduce their 
actions from a preference ranking and thereby maximize their utility. He introduces 
the term intentional rationality, which shifts the focus away from the dichotomy of 
rational versus irrational behavior implicit in Simon’s theory. The notion of 
intentional rationality, instead, concentrates on the means-ends relationship, that is, 
the wish to achieve a goal that optimizes one’s utility without knowing the best means 
to apply for realizing that goal. If one looks at procedural uncertainty, Beckert’s 
intentionally rational actors choose innovative strategies whose efficiency cannot be 
anticipated.  
In Bourdieu’s sociological approach, however, such a rationale may apply only to 
a limited number of situations, and implies only one type of rationality (most closely 
to the calculating spirit of modern capitalism). It omits situations characterized by the 
lack of all the information that would be necessary to make decisions with certain 
outcomes as described by Dosi and Egidi (1988). Dequech (1997) differentiates such 
conditions into weak and strong forms of uncertainty. Whereas the weak version is tied 
to Savage’s standard expected utility (SEU) theory, the latter is characterized by the 
absence of unique, additive and fully reliable probability distributions (see also Clark 
1997; Denzau and North 1994).10  
This strong form of uncertainty is at least implicitly assumed in Bourdieu’s 
conceptualization of the “space of possibles” that implies the existence and emergence 
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of relatively independent field forces which spontaneous and creative agents 
encounter and practically master. As a consequence, even the most sophisticated 
economic agent cannot state a list of certain outcomes ranked in terms of their values. 
For this sociological treatment of uncertainty, one may refer to fundamental 
uncertainty as defined by Dequech (2006) in economics literature. Dequech 
recognized, as North (1999) points out, that this form of uncertainty is based on the 
notion of non-ergodicity, which describes the world as ever changing in novel ways. It 
is characterized by the possibility of creativity and non-predetermined structural 
change.  
On the lines of Schumpeter’s (1989) argument — and if reformulated, in 
sociological terms — agents must innovate and be active to be able to compete in the 
market field. On the contrary, if the habitus were a passive construct only and the 
results could not be known owing to people’s limited capabilities to deal with 
complex reality, then such theory would speak for rule-following and reproductive 
behavior. This behavior would be more appropriate in such situations than under 
fundamental uncertainty. In addition, the author shares and reformulates Dequech’s 
argument (2001, 922): Fundamental uncertainty is compatible with social reality; the 
latter is subject to non-predetermined structural change, but may also be complex and 
people’s habitus may also constrain their cognitive capabilities. In other words, 
personal history shapes the way one perceives things.  
Finally, one may argue for situations of procedural uncertainty wherein 
individuals are assumed to adopt a satisficing rather than an optimizing strategy. They 
search for satisfactory solutions, given some aspirational levels, as Simon argued. 
Rationality is treated as an individual matter, aspirations being exogenous. Bourdieu’s 
theory would instead account for different levels and qualities of aspirations and 
dispositions. Decision makers would adopt reasonable strategies that suit their social 
environment, and their expectations of what is practically possible and suitable to 
their situation. Economic reasoning is treated neither as a strictly individual nor as a 
collective mechanism; to him, it is an encounter with both. This notion would stress 
that agents with individual aspirations incorporate collective aspiration levels into 
their action. These in turn create external, agent independent effects on the field as 
such.  
One form of strategic action is signaling to convey information to others 
(Feldman and March 1981). Such signaling is particularly relevant to highly 
competitive markets where parties must deal with conflicts, handle all kinds of 
uncertainty, provide novel products, and develop innovative strategies. It is central to 
White’s market model, which is one of the most prominent network approaches that 
advances the account for the structural and cultural elements of economic action in 
social analysis. That is why it is shown subsequently in the way Bourdieu’s 
understanding of the economy is different from that of White. 
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The Case of Signaling 
 
Now, this last set of considerations allows one to shift the focus away from the 
analytical conceptualization of social structures and action, as held in Bourdieu’s 
theory, and the role of uncertainty — the main topic of the preceding section — onto 
the concrete accounts of social structure and uncertainty in White’s work.  
In Identity and Control, White (1992) builds on Spence’s signaling model (1976, 
2002) that treats markets as they are, rather than as markets embedded in social 
structures (networks). Two aspects make this point most evident: the 
conceptualization of quality, and its assessment. First, in the original model by 
Spence, quality is considered an inherent attribute, a separate individual ability. This 
ability spreads along the whole continuum of talent of a big pool of individuals; the 
continuous distribution over talent is considered an index of quality.11 Second, the 
assessment of quality is considered primarily cognitive and neglectful of the 
representation of social structure.  
In contrast, many network analysts employ a different approach and attempt to 
conceptualize social structure (for a relational approach, see McAdam 1986 and 
Rosenthal et al. 1985; for a positional analysis, see Bearman 1993 and Lorain and 
White 1971). On the positional side, the early White and related scholars present 
network data that describes change over time (White, Boorman and Breiger 1976, 
763-768); they assume that markets are socially constructed, because they are based on 
social role and network configurations by actors of equivalent relations (see Lorain 
and White 1971).  
White’s concept of networks resembles analytically that of Bourdieu’s fields 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 114). What distinguishes White’s work, particularly 
his early work, from that of Bourdieu is his account of the processes of structural 
transformations. His delineation of structural processes does not include individual 
manipulations that shape cognitive schemes, such as those related to the notion of 
habitus. Second, White’s approach adheres to the model of homo economicus, which is 
implicit in the assumption that network agents who behave instrumentally are utility 
maximizers, which in fact comes from the domain of rational choice theory.  
In his more recent works, White took a significant theoretical step in an 
alternative direction. In Identity and Control (1992), he suggests an interrelationship 
between motivations and identities, and social structures. He accounts for the 
subjective and argues that one sense of identity is that of a social face, the basis  
 
for our everyday constructs for the person . . . as an actor in a role 
[supplying] preferences that may guide him or her towards goals, and into 
rational action (314-315). 
  
This new approach also shapes his network-based market model that builds on a 
modified rational choice model of individual action. In his later work, Markets from 
Networks (White 2002, 296) he reformulates rationality as a “collection of habits 
derived from and ensconced only through interaction and subsequently reinforced.”12  
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However, the crucial issue is not so much of rationality as of the method of 
construing and signaling with respect to meanings and measures of quality. Being a 
leading exponent of structuralist determinism in his earlier days, White turned, in his 
market modeling, to matching the processes of buyers and sellers who mutually signal 
their interests and qualifications. His idea was that signals, in terms of activities, 
illustrated one’s identity through prior personal history. For example, one’s 
educational credentials are included in the basic model, specific competences and 
skills, and relationships (see Jones 2002).  
Signals also include relatively fixed attributes, described as indices (Goffman 
1959; Spence 1973) such as age, ethnicity, gender, and nationality. Exchange parties 
try to infer how these indices will influence a match. Signals, as activities and 
attributes, transmit information to others; they take place under conflicts of interest 
and are conveyed with an anticipation of decisions (Feldman and March 1981). 
White (2002) formulates that signalers do not perceive demand curves; instead they 
perceive choices of others, or what is called a generalized market schedule of observed 
outcomes on the basis of which they make their decisions. Based on such a schedule, 
observers can infer the performance of the signaler based on the meaning of the signal 
and the context in which it is sent. 
How does White account for the uncertainty in his network-based model? 
According to White, uncertainty facilitates the construction of some sort of 
institution, a market. The market depends on the common actors’ perception of a 
schedule of wages that could be expected in response to various signals of quality. The 
implicit assumption is one of bounded rationality implying procedural uncertainty or, 
in more substantive cases, ambiguity (see Dequech 2001, 916). The latter case refers 
to situations in which “information may become available to the decision makers, 
changing their probability distributions and/or their assessment of the reliability of 
these distributions.”  
Ambiguous signals are then interpreted in light of a person’s past experiences. 
Those who have more experience in attending signals and seeing the outcome of 
decisions (e.g., hiring) will be able to reduce such ambiguity. If one can thus reduce 
ambiguity, people may wish to wait for more information and thus temporarily refuse 
to bet under ambiguity by revealing any subjective probabilities. They would wait until 
they have collected what Jones (2002, 211) called signaling expertise.  
However, what would motivate actors if some types of information will never be 
obtained ex ante, no matter how long they wait? Despite its high importance for 
network theory, White’s approach does not really explain the motivation of individual 
action on the basis of the historical transformation of past trajectories and the 
evolution of dispositions and preferences guiding action as proposed in Bourdieu’s 
field and habitus approach. This drawback, it is argued, would be even more evident 
under fundamental uncertainty. Normative commitments and values would play an 
ever more important role to shape orientations and aspirations of historical actors. 
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Conclusion 
 
Despite numerous scholarly contributions in economic sociology over the past 
decades, social theorists and network scholars could not so far reach their full 
potential to systematically examine the fundamental theoretical presuppositions of 
individual action. The differences in terminology and methodology between the two 
research strands have probably prevented them from any further substantial cross-
fertilization and dialogue.  
This article has shown how Bourdieu’s approach actually responds to the key 
criticism of the embeddedness tradition, namely that induced economic sociology to 
prioritize the analysis of structural forces over the question of the subjective and 
historical foundations of individual action. Its principal achievement, it is argued, has 
been to transform a merely a-historical understanding of individual actors located in 
social fields into a more precise, theoretical concept for social analysis. It has also been 
suggested, that despite its powerful conceptualizations of the interrelationship 
between social structure and agency, this approach, having been developed up to date, 
has only implicitly theorized the conditions under which actors tend to innovate, 
rather than reproduce; as a result, the potential of the generative habitus for the 
moment of creating novel strategies has often been overseen in the very 
conceptualization of social action.  
Bringing this argument to the fore allows one to provide, particularly the 
network analysts, with a strong conceptualization of the actor as a historical and 
heterogeneous entity, probably at the cost of losing focus on meso-dynamics in 
networks. The position taken here is that of complementing network approaches with 
an agent-based construct of economic reason as proposed by Bourdieu. This would 
allow for a dynamic view of socially constructed action undertaken by agents using the 
power attached to them by virtue of their position. It also depends to a considerable 
extent on the pre-understanding or apprehension of certain stimuli, which the author 
currently illustrates by signals and strategies attached to them. The suggestion 
advanced here is that economic sociology should enhance its analysis of economic 
action by linking micro- and macro-levels systematically to advance its understanding 
of historical and cognitive factors for a more comprehensive conception of economic 
action.  
 
Notes 
 
1. Granovetter generalized a concept of social action as embedded in social networks. He noted that 
“actors do not decide as atoms outside the social context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script 
written for them by the particular intersection of social categories that they happen to 
occupy” (1985, 487). In this way, he conceptualized action as embedded in social networks that is 
not generated by the particular intersection of social categories. 
2. Bourdieu’s approach to economic issues of new economic sociology can be located in his studies on 
“Work and Workers in Algeria” (1963), as well as his later work on The Social Structures of the 
Economy (2005b). His contribution on “The Principles of an Economic Anthropology” (2005a) 
focuses on core economic phenomena, such as market preferences, strategies, or decision making 
(for a detailed discussion see Diaz-Bone 2006 and Florian 2006). 
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3. With his understanding of the economy, Bourdieu put himself in opposition to the interactionist’s 
vision (Cooley [1902] 1964; Mead 1934). The latter places at its center the influence directly exerted 
by one firm over another through any kind of interaction. 
4. In a similar vein, Callon (1998) calls the embedding of market in economic sciences a theory effect. 
5. This account reminds one of the circularity referred to by Durkheim (1922) in his works on the 
relation between society and the individual, even though Bourdieu places greater relevance on 
individual dispositions and the competence of improvisation. This stands in contrast to Durkheim’s 
stronger mechanistic vision (Crossley 2001). 
6. Its transmission is best hidden, so that it receives higher weight in the reproduction of the field than 
direct, tangible forms that are more strongly controlled. Bourdieu’s view may thus be conceived as 
being rooted in anticipation of the distinction between the two states of capital — the objectified and 
the embodied — which have been spelled out in “The Instinct of Workmanship” by Thorsten Veblen 
(1898). 
7. As a power in terms of brand loyalty, or as a commitment to a firm in the case of employees, 
symbolic capital functions as a form of credit. It presupposes the people’s trust and belief upon 
which it bears, because they are supposed to grant it credence. 
8. In contrast, pragmatists’ views suggest that any habit or rule of action already implies the perception 
of situations that already incorporate a judgment on the appropriateness of certain kinds of action 
(Bandelj 2009; Joas 1996, 160). 
9. One may refer to Fazio’s (1990) work here. Contrary to Etzioni’s approach, which remains in the 
rational calculus (even though normative), Fazio’s routinized behavior is a short cut based on 
individual history. It is similar to the way in which habitus represents a short cut of personal history. 
10. Here, the author follows Dequech’s interpretation of strong uncertainty, rather than Furubotn and 
Richter (2005) who seem to interpret Denzau and North (1994) in terms of procedural uncertainty. 
11. No systematic distinction between the level of the signal and its associated quality was made, which 
would be relevant to the evaluation of the signaler’s productivity (see White 2002). For modified 
versions of Spence’s basic model, see, for instance, George Akerlof (1970) and Winter and Phelps 
(1970). 
12. In a similar way, Friedman and McAdam (1992) claim that network theory needs a model of 
rationality which allows for collective identities (and not just material resources) as a potentially 
powerful motivator for action. 
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